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We analyze vertical integration in the case of upstream competition and 
compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent 
(i.e., upstream monopoly). In so doing, we make two contributions to the 
modelling of strategic vertical integration. First, we base industry structure – 
namely, the ownership of assets – firmly within the property rights approach to 
firm boundaries. Second, we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a 
fully specified, non-cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare 
outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly. Given this, we 
demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoff of integrating 
parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms 
integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. We also 
consider the potential for integration to internalize competitive externalities in a 
manner that cannot be achieved under non-integration; i.e., by favouring internal 
over external supply. We demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely 
to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream 
competition. Our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence 
of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially 
undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and, depending upon the strength of 
downstream competition (i.e., product differentiation), the opposite could easily 
be the case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: L42 
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There are long-standing antitrust concerns about potential social detriment from 
vertical integration, centering on integration by an upstream monopoly into a downstream 
segment. The monopolist may restrict supply after integration, foreclose on downstream 
rivals, or it may appropriate more rents at the expense of downstream firms. Moreover, 
there is a general belief that improving competition in the bottleneck segment would 
alleviate these concerns.
1
There are two ways that competition might serve to discourage socially harmful 
vertical integration. First, upstream competitors will respond to attempts by a firm to 
foreclose on non-integrated downstream firms by expanding their supply to them. This 
undermines the ability of an upstream firm to use vertical integration to raise prices in the 
industry by restricting supply to some downstream firms. Second, it is claimed that 
competition reduces any bargaining power conferred on the monopolist by integration 
and any foreclosure threats.
To date, there has been no unified theoretical analysis of the role that competition 
plays on the incentives for vertical integration and its social desirability. This paper 
provides such an analysis. In so doing, our primary task is to provide a model capable of 
studying the pure effect of an increase in competition. Thus, we need to consider an 
environment where competition does not otherwise change total resources, technical 
productivity or the nature of bargaining in the industry in an ad hoc way. To this end, we 
consider an environment where there are two downstream and two upstream assets. 
Upstream competition is modeled as a situation where the two upstream assets are 
separately owned, whereas under upstream monopoly they are commonly owned.  
Our main modeling contribution, however, lies in the game we use to model 
bargaining between upstream and downstream firms over input supply. We consider an 
environment, common in the property rights approach to firm boundaries (Grossman and 
1 See Williamson (1987) for a discussion of these presumptions. The US Department of Justice merger 
guidelines (DOJ, 1984) state that vertical mergers are only likely to attract concern if concentration in a 
market (in practice, an upstream market) is high.  2
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), where the manager of each asset has asset-specific 
skills, and integration decisions – i.e., the ownership of assets – are made prior to 
bargaining over the supply of inputs. This set-up allows us to consider the bargaining 
effects of vertical integration in a similar manner to the standard property rights literature. 
Importantly, in our environment, integration does not remove the potential for the 
manager of an acquired firm to earn rents. This is true both for a firm integrating 
vertically but also for an upstream monopoly where one upstream asset is owned by the 
manager of the other. Thus, we can capture the full effects of integration on bargaining 
relations in the industry. Moreover, in so doing, we are able to investigate new issues in 
strategic vertical integration; namely, the potential differences between forward and 
backwards integration.
2
Bargaining takes a non-cooperative form with each upstream-downstream pair 
negotiating sequentially over the quantity supplied and a price between them. A key 
feature of our bargaining game is that changes in market structure can change supply 
arrangements, either because such arrangements can be renegotiated (as in Stole and 
Zwiebel, 1996) or because they are made contingent on changes in market structure (as in 
Inderst and Wey, 2003). We demonstrate that this type of bargaining leads naturally to 
some of the inefficiencies emphasised in the contracting externalities literature: an 
upstream supplier with more than one buyer downstream oversupplies the market, 
because they cannot commit not to impose negative externalities on one buyer by selling 
large quantities to the other buyer.
3 Nonetheless, we are able to characterise surplus 
division; relating the realised payoffs of upstream and downstream firms to their relative 
power if sets of supply relationships were to be severed. Indeed, the payoffs resemble a 
‘coalition structure’ similar to those derived in cooperative game theory, albeit over a 
2 Most analyses of the competitive impacts of vertical integration make no distinction between the type of 
integration (e.g., Riordan and Salop, 1995; Klass and Salinger, 1995; and Hovenkamp, 2001). The reason 
for this is that both parties have to agree to merge and so it is generally held to be in their joint interest. 
However, when there are many firms, as is well known, changes in asset ownership have differential 
impacts on different types of agents (Hart and Moore, 1990). We demonstrate that this is the case for 
vertical integration in general as forward and backward integration have different returns to the merging 
parties and different effects on outsiders. While the distinction is overlooked in competition policy, our 
analysis highlights where it may be important and given more credence. 
3 The seminal work on this comes from Hart and Tirole (1990) in terms of its relationship to vertical 
integration. However, McAfee and Schwartz (1994), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and Segal (1999) provide 
comprehensive treatments of the contracting problem when there are externalities amongst firms. See Rey 3
reduced industry surplus. 
We demonstrate that vertical integration has two potential effects. First, the 
bargaining position of all agents changes. Second, some contracting externalities are 
internalised. To demonstrate the first, we initially consider an environment where 
downstream assets are in different markets so that there are no competitive externalities 
between them (Section 3). There vertical integration changes only the distribution of 
bargaining power and not the surplus generated. We show that vertical integration can 
increase the sum of payoffs for the integrating parties because it improves their 
bargaining position in negotiations with independent firms; specifically, it eliminates the 
possibility of market structures that may be favourable to independents.  
Importantly, we demonstrate that there is a greater incentive for vertical 
integration under upstream competition than under monopoly. This is because the 
bargaining benefits come from the redistribution of rents from non-integrating parties; 
and in a monopoly, the non-integrating parties already have low rents. Thus, competition 
enhances rather than reduces the potential for purely strategic vertical integration. 
Moreover, we find that integration occurs from the more competitive segment into the 
less competitive segment: for example, forward integration is chosen over backward 
integration only when upstream firms are closer substitutes (in terms of generating 
overall industry profits) than downstream firms. 
When competitive externalities downstream are taken into account, there is an 
additional incentive for vertical integration: integration can internalise those externalities 
and lead to some degree of monopolization in the industry. The integrated upstream firm, 
when dealing with the non-integrated downstream firm, will internalise the effect of its 
supply on its own downstream firm. Vertical integration of an upstream monopolist leads 
to higher industry profits than are possible under upstream competition, raising the 
returns to integration under upstream monopoly relative to upstream competition and 
mitigating the returns identified earlier that were based purely on bargaining. Indeed, we 
demonstrate that, in some situations, industry profits may fall (along with consumer 
surplus) as a result of vertical integration under upstream competition. 
In this environment, we identify product differentiation as a key parameter driving 
and Tirole (2003) for a survey.  4
incentives to vertically integrate. In particular, we find that when product differentiation 
is low (high), backward integration is more (less) privately profitable than forward 
integration. Importantly, while the conventional concern about vertical integration is 
confirmed when downstream products are relatively homogeneous, the incentive for such 
integration will be higher under upstream competition than upstream monopoly if 
products are relatively differentiated. Both these results suggest that the conventional 
approach of examining the market power of the acquiring firm will not necessarily allow 
one to draw a conclusion as to whether vertical integration is anti-competitive or not. 
The paper that is closest to our own is that of Hart and Tirole (1990) – hereafter, 
HT. That paper is the first to identify the bargaining and monopolisation effects that arise 
from vertical integration.
4 While their paper identifies these using three separate variants 
– each with extreme assumptions regarding downstream demand and upstream costs – 
our model nests all of those variants within a single model that allows for more general 
downstream and upstream environments; in particular, we allow for downstream product 
differentiation that is identified as an important driver of incentives for integration.
5 Thus, 
one contribution of our paper is to demonstrate the robustness of HT’s results.
6
Nonetheless, we identify subtle differences between our conclusions and theirs 
throughout. For instance, as in HT, we demonstrate that in some cases vertical integration 
may lead to a situation where there is foreclosure in input supply to the non-integrated
downstream firm. However, in our model, this does not necessarily imply there is 
4 Bolton and Whinston (1993) also identify a bargaining effect from vertical integration. Their model, 
however, does not have downstream firms directly competing, focusing instead of the impact of bargaining 
on investment incentives. Their analysis is complementary with that here although, like HT, it is formulated 
in a special manner to remove any distinction between forward and backward integration. 
5 A recent paper by Chemla (2003) also nests a bargaining and monopolization effect. He demonstrates that 
an upstream monopolist may expend resources to encourage entry by downstream firms so as to limit their 
bargaining power. He demonstrates that vertical integration will have the dual effect of reducing the 
monopolist’s need to expend those resources and also lead to higher industry profits. de Fontenay and Gans 
(1999) similarly demonstrate that vertical integration can lead to reduced downstream entry and higher 
industry profits, but do so using a bargaining framework similar to that considered in this paper, although 
without an incomplete-contracts perspective on the effect of integration. The current paper does not study 
the effect of changes in bargaining power the entry decisions of firms, but focuses its attention on the effect 
of upstream competition. 
6 Klass and Salinger (1995) argued that HT’s results were highly specific and may not carry over to more 
general environments. Indeed, as they note, many of HT’s results rely on integration precipitating exit of an 
upstream or downstream firm. We demonstrate similar bargaining and monopolization effects to HT but 
without the use of the exit device that drove many of their results (in addition, to our more general 
technology and demand assumptions). 5
foreclosure in payments to that firm, as the integrated firm is interested in preserving the 
option to supply to that firm if bargaining with its internal manager were to break down. 
Significantly, however, HT’s model is not equipped to properly examine the 
questions that motivate us here. First, they assume that upstream and downstream firms 
simply share the surplus arising from a negotiation according to a fixed parameter, rather 
than model the drivers of bargaining power—in particular, the asset-specific skills that 
confer bargaining power in the property rights literature.
7 Consequently, there is no 
distinction between forward and backward integration. In contrast, in our model, the 
bargaining position of each firm is driven by their roles in possible market structures that 
arise following breakdowns in individual negotiations. As forward and backwards 
integration have different implications as to what market structures are feasible, there will 
be a difference in the incentives and impact of each. 
Second, their analysis of the impact of upstream competition is limited to an 
analysis of the efficiency of the weaker upstream firm. That is, they consider what 
happens to the incentives to vertically integrate as the weaker upstream firm becomes 
more efficient, which confounds the effect of market power and the effect of superior 
productivity. Our analysis of the impact of upstream competition models monopoly as the 
horizontal integration of both upstream assets. And as such, it explicitly considers the 
impact of vertical integration on internal arrangements within the upstream monopoly. 
In terms of its bargaining game, the paper has several antecedents. Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) were the first to focus on Shapley values as 
likely outcomes of the bargaining game between firms. Variants of the bargaining game 
developed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) have been applied to bargaining between firms 
over variable quantities by de Fontenay and Gans (1999, 2003b), Inderst and Wey (2003) 
and Björnerstedt and Stennek (2001).
8 Note that contracting externalities are ruled out in 
all of the above game structures: considering environments in which downstream players 
impose no externalities on each other. Here instead we allow sequential contracting in an 
environment in which downstream players are in the same market, leading to contract 
7 Other papers in the literature avoid the need to model the drivers of bargaining power by assuming that 
either upstream or downstream firms have all of the bargaining power (Rey and Tirole, 2003; Chemla, 
2003). This is also a common assumption in the contracting with externalities literature (McAfee and 
Schwartz, 1994; and Segal, 1999). 6
externalities as explored elsewhere in the literature on vertical integration.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up our basic model
and, in particular, the non-cooperative bargaining game that is capable of assessing the 
impact of upstream competition on the incentives for vertical integration. Sections 3 and 
4 then provide analyses of the ‘no externalities’ and ‘competitive externalities’ cases
when one vertical merger is possible. Section 5 considers incentives for a counter merger
and the question of whether the possibility of such mergers may alter incentives for the
initial merger. A final section concludes.
2 Model Set-Up 
We examine an industry that has two upstream and two downstream assets. The 
upstream assets produce inputs that are used by downstream assets to make final goods. 
Inputs from at least one upstream asset are necessary for valuable production 
downstream. In addition, associated with each asset is a manager endowed with asset-
specific human capital that is in turn necessary to generate valuable goods and services
from that asset.
9 We denote the respective managers of upstream firms A and B by UA and 
UB, and downstream managers by D1 and D2. Integration changes the ownership of these 
assets; however, the manager associated with an asset will not change, as each remains
necessary for its use.
An upstream asset, Uj, can produce input quantities  1j q  and  2 j q  for D1 and D2,
respectively. Its costs are given by 12 (, ) j jj cq q , assumed to be weakly convex in 
12 (, ) j j qq .
Using input quantities,   and   from U iA q iB q A and UB, respectively, Di makes a
downstream profit (gross of payments to upstream suppliers) of  ( , , , ) ii Ai B i A i B qqq q S 
where -i denotes the index of i’s potential downstream rival. We assume that  (.) i S  is
concave in  , non-increasing in ( . (,) iA iB qq ,) iA iB qq 
8 Only de Fontenay and Gans examine vertical integration; Inderst and Wey examine horizontal mergers.
9 This is a common set-up in the incomplete contracts literature (see, for example, Bolton and Whinston,7
Finally, it will often be convenient to express outcomes in terms of industry
profits that can be generated for alternative configurations of supply relationships. Let 
11
22
12 , 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
,
( ) m a x (,,,) (,,,) (,) (,
AB
AB
) A Bq q A B A B A B A B A A A B B
qq
D D U U qqqq qqqq c qq c qq SS 3{    B
be maximized industry profits when both upstream assets can potentially provide inputs 
that can be used by both downstream assets. Industry profits for other supply possibilities 
are similarly defined. For example,
11 1, 1 1 1 1 ( ) max ( , ,0,0) ( ,0) ( ,0)
AB A B q q AB AA BB DU U q q c q c q S 3{   1
1 11 1 ( ) max ( ,0,0,0) ( ,0)
A Aq A A A DU q c q S 3{  1
The Le Châtelier principle implies that maximised industry profits are higher whenever 
an additional asset and its associated manager are used. For example,
12 2 () ( ) A A D DU DU 3t 3  and  12 12 () ( ) A BA D DU U DDU 3t 3 .
It is possible that a particular market structure may involve a ‘partitioned’ set of 
supply arrangements. For instance, D1 may only negotiate with UA and D2 may only 
negotiate with UB. For this situation, let   be the equilibrium input supply 
quantities.
12 ˆˆ (, AB qq )
10 Then,
12 1 1 2 1 ˆˆ ˆ ( , ) ( ,0,0, ) ( ,0) AB A B A A DU DU q q c q S 3{ 
21 2 2 1 2 ˆˆ ˆ (,) ( 0 , , , 0 ) ( 0 , BA B A B ) B DUD U q q c q S 3{ 
denotes the (equilibrium) profits to each buyer/supplier pair, respectively.
2.1 Timeline
The timeline for our model is as follows:
STAGE 0 (Asset Allocation): Ownership of assets is determined among all four
managers.
STAGE 1 (Bargaining): Bargaining over input supply terms takes place. 
STAGE 2 (Production): Production takes place and payoffs are realised. 
Initially, the asset allocation process is not modeled as a fully specified endogenous 
1A q 2
1993 and Hart, 1995).
10 Below we demonstrate that this equilibrium is Cournot, i.e., that
 and 
1 11 1 2 ˆˆ argmax ( ,0,0, ) ( ,0)
A Aq A B A qq q c S  
2 22 2 1 ˆˆ argmax (0, , ,0) (0, )
B B qB A B qq q B cq S   . In actuality, 8
process. That is, we focus on more limited, partial incentives, including whether 
integration is jointly profitable for the merging parties. Nonetheless, in Section 5, we 
consider the possibility of counter-mergers and possible equilibria in Stage 0 to check
(and, in general, confirm) the robustness of this partial approach. For now, the stage that 
requires further elaboration is the bargaining stage and we turn now to discuss that in
detail.
Note that we do not explicitly model any efficiency cost to integration. This could
involve a straight resource costs (as in HT) or alternatively investment incentive effects 
(as in Hart and Moore, 1990; Bolton and Whinston, 1993). It would be straightforward to 
incorporate both upstream and downstream investment into the model here, however, 
they are omitted so as to focus on the main effects as they relate to competition.
Essentially, the impact of integration on such investment will involve a similar set of 
effects as those considered by Segal and Whinston (2000) for the exclusive dealing case. 
For the remainder of this paper, we simply compare the profitability of integration under 
different market structures, supposing that the most profitable opportunities of integration 
are the least likely to be outweighed by the cost of lost resources or investment.
2.2 Bargaining
Bargaining is bilateral, vertical (occurring between managers of individual 
upstream and downstream assets), and sequential (only one pair of agents bargain at a 
time). Each upstream-downstream pair negotiates over price and quantity supply terms.
For example, Uj and Di bargain over terms specifying a quantity of inputs purchased, qij,
and a lump-sum transfer,   paid by i to j. When bargaining takes place internally, 
quantity is not relevant and the focus of negotiations is over the size of any transfer
payment, paid by j to manager i for i’s participation in the production process. 
ij p 
ij t
Our bargaining game takes a particular extensive form.
11 The game is as follows:
none of the results hinge on this result and any type of oligopolistic outcome could be considered.
11 Our non-cooperative bargaining game is an extension of the extensive form game underlying the wage
bargaining model of Stole and Zwiebel (1996)—hereafter SZ – to the case of vertical supply agreements.
The key difference between our environment and SZ’s is that input supply quantities are potentially 
variable and there is competition on both sides of the market. Their model had a single firm bargaining with
many workers, each of whom supplied an indivisible unit of labor. 9
fix an order of pairs to negotiate in sequence. This order is common knowledge and, as 
will be demonstrated, irrelevant for the equilibrium outcome. Each pair negotiates
bilaterally in a manner specified by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986); i.e., each 
makes sequential offers to one other until they reach an agreement, and after an offer is
rejected there is an infinitesimal probability of an irrevocable breakdown in their 
negotiations. Once an agreement is reached, the next pair begins bargaining.
12 If a 
breakdown occurs before an agreement is reached, the entire sequence of negotiations 
takes place again (in the same order as before), but without any pair whose negotiations 
have broken down previously. Once all pairs have either agreed or suffered a breakdown,
the game ends. 
Figure 1 presents a possible sequence of bargaining negotiations for the baseline 
case of non-integration. Each box represents a bargaining session between a pair which 
can result in agreement (A) or breakdown (B).  (.) *  denotes the subgame which takes 
place over the indicated sequence of pairs. Thus, 1212 (, ,, ABB DU DU DU DU ) A * indicates a 
sequence of negotiations beginning with D1-UA, followed by D2-UB, D1-UB and D2-UA,
respectively. If there is a breakdown in negotiations between D1 and UA in this sequence, 
the renegotiation subgame, , is triggered. Thus, breakdowns trigger 
a sequence of renegotiations between all remaining pairs in the original order.
212 (,, BB DU DU DU * ) A
13
Consequently, when agents bargain together, they take as their disagreement payoff their 
payoff from this renegotiation game.
There are two key assumptions of this bargaining game that are worth
emphasising: incomplete information and renegotiations. First, as is commonly assumed
in the literature on vertical contracting but not explicitly depicted in Figure 1, our 
bargaining game is one of incomplete information.
14 In particular, agents do not know the 
prices and quantities agreed upon in earlier negotiations that they did not participate in. 
These cannot be observed ex post; eliminating the ability to agree to contracts contingent
upon the particular pricing outcomes of other negotiations. Thus, a negotiating pair can 
12 As is well-known, holding the outcomes of other negotiations as fixed, as the probability of a breakdown
becomes arbitrarily small, a pair bargaining in this fashion will agree on the Nash bargaining solution.
13 As will be demonstrated below, as in SZ, the original order does not matter for surplus generated or
payoffs received.
14 See, for example, HT, O’Brien and Schaffer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), Rey and Tirole10
engage in secret discounting that enhances the future competitive position of a 
downstream firm at the expense of their rivals. Negotiating pairs anticipate such effects 
impacting on their own equilibrium agreements. 
Given this, agents will form beliefs about the outcomes of negotiations they do 
not participate in. To refine the set of possible equilibrium outcomes, we adopt the 
commonly used assumption that agents hold passive beliefs regarding the prices agreed 
upon in earlier negotiations.
15 Under passive beliefs, an agent’s beliefs about the 
outcomes of other negotiations are not revised by an unexpected price offer.
Second, in our bargaining game, once negotiations have commenced, a supply 
agreement will only take place in equilibrium if the joint payoff to the upstream and 
downstream pair exceeds what each might receive if an agreement never takes place.
16
This is reasonable as a non-agreement is possible and the parties should, given the lump-
sum transfer, be able to jointly earn more from agreement than not. 
But what payoffs will the parties expect to receive if an agreement never takes 
place? Answering this requires specifying what occurs in remaining negotiations and to 
past agreements in the event of such a breakdown. First, given that the breakdown is 
permanent, it is reasonable to assume that such events are common knowledge. Second, it 
is plausible that, in reality, remaining supply agreements might be impacted upon by such 
an event. For example, if a downstream firm were supplied by both upstream firms, but 
the relationship with one broke down irrevocably, the remaining upstream firm might 
eventually be able to negotiate a more favourable agreement. We take this into account 
by assuming that in the event of a breakdown all other supply agreements can be 
renegotiated.
This has two interpretations, both of which turn out to have equivalent 
(1997) and Segal (1999). 
15 The assumption of passive beliefs arises naturally when supply negotiations occur simultaneously or 
downstream firms are not able to observe the precise sequence of negotiations (Hart and Tirole, 1990). 
While, for notational convenience, we assume here that agents know the negotiation order, our model and 
environment could easily accommodate a situation where this was unverifiable. See McAfee and Schwartz 
(1994) and Rey and Tirole (2003) for detailed discussions. SZ also implicitly assume passive beliefs when 
analysing the equilibrium outcome of their extensive form game. Recently, Segal and Whinston (2003) and 
Rey and Verge (2002) have constructed models relaxing the passive beliefs assumption to largely confirm 
the robustness of results in the vertically contracting literature. 
16 This assumption is an axiom in the bilateral oligopoly bargaining model of Inderst and Wey (2003). Here 
it is an outcome of the particular extensive form bargaining game that fixes the probability that an 11
implications. First, the renegotiation option may arise because, say, an upstream firm can 
hold up its downstream customer by refusing to honor the past agreement. If that 
agreement is too costly to enforce, it will be renegotiated. Operationally, this amounts to 
an assumption that parties cannot jointly commit to refrain from renegotiations following 
a breakdown in supply relationships by others.
17 This lack of commitment is a common 
assumption in the literature on incomplete contracts and the property rights theory of the 
firm.
18 It is generally applied in environments in which price contracts are renegotiated 
more frequently than the market or ownership structure changes.
19
Second, parties may negotiate contracts that take into account contingencies 
relating to the breakdown of other supply agreements. Such contracts will specify price 
and quantity terms if no breakdown were to occur elsewhere but also how those terms 
would be adjusted if supply relationships involving other pairs were to dissolve.
20 Below 
we demonstrate that there is an equilibrium where the contingent supply terms are the 
same as the terms that would be renegotiation-proof in the event that contingent contracts 
were not binding. However, as in the contingent contract case of Inderst and Wey (2003), 
and in contrast to equilibria arising in the incomplete contracts case, this equilibrium may 
not be unique. For this reason, the specific extensive form game reflects the first 
interpretation but we will demonstrate equivalence to the latter interpretation for key 
results below. 
Because agreements are renegotiated following breakdowns or are made 
exogenous breakdown may occur during bilateral negotiations. 
17 Alternatively, parties could write contingent contracts with terms contingent upon the structure of supply 
agreements elsewhere but those contingent contracts must be renegotiation proof. 
18 This literature begins formally with the work of Grossman and Hart (1986) but has its antecedents in 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1975, 1985). Hart (1995) reviews the theory of 
contractual incompleteness based on the costliness of writing contracts to deal with every contingency. Hart 
and Moore (1988) and Dewatripont (1989) develop the theory with regard to an inability to commit not to 
renegotiate contract terms ex post. 
19 There are two reasons why an assumption of contractual incompleteness is reasonable in the context of 
this paper on vertical integration. First, the basic idea is that it is costly to write contracts contingent on 
small probability events. As will be demonstrated below, we treat a permanent breakdown in negotiations 
as an extremely unlikely event (with an infinitesimally small probability); falling into the class of 
contingencies that would not be contractible. Second, our model of vertical integration is based on the 
property rights framework that presumes that all negotiations take place after asset ownership is 
determined; that is, supply negotiations cannot be made contingent upon ownership structures. In this 
respect, by preventing contracts being contingent upon the structure of supply agreements we are treating 
changes in these in a symmetric manner to changes in ownership. 
20 Again, such contingent contracts an axiom in the bargaining model of Inderst and Wey (2003). 12
contingent upon them, subgame perfection implies that all players take disagreement 
payoffs as given in their current negotiations.
21 The irrevocability of breakdowns means
that following this, the game will never return to the current “node of the game,” the set 
of negotiations currently underway. Therefore, agents cannot credibly choose a post-
breakdown strategy that will improve their payoff in the current negotiations. Instead,
after a breakdown they will follow the strategy that maximizes payoffs in post-
breakdown negotiations. 
The combination of our assumptions regarding passive beliefs and what happens 
following breakdowns elsewhere serves to simplify the multi-person bargaining game
dramatically. In particular, we can analyze each bilateral negotiation, taking the outcomes
of other negotiations as given. This allows us to derive explicit closed form solutions in 
an otherwise general economic environment (in terms of demand and production 
technologies); making the analysis of bilateral oligopoly quite tractable. In addition, as
will be demonstrated below, our solution concept replicates cooperative bargaining 
concepts (such as the Shapley value and its extensions by Myerson) only in certain 
circumstances. In particular, when there are competitive externalities, our solution is 
novel in that it does not arise in cooperative game theory.
22
3 Bargaining and Integration with No Externalities
We begin by assuming, in this section, that there are no competitive externalities
downstream.
23 That is, for each Di,(,, , ) (,, 0 , 0 ) (,) i iA iB iA iB i iA iB i iA iB qqq q qq qq SS S   {  for 
all . This may arise if downstream firms sell distinct products using a similar
set of inputs, sell products in different geographical markets, or sell highly differentiated 
(,) iA iB qq 
21 Alternatively, the disagreement payoffs are governed by the contingencies negotiated by others are not
observed across negotiating pairs. Hence, given passive beliefs, they cannot be impacted upon by the
negotiating pair.
22 For example, Inderst and Wey (2003) use an axiomatic approach to analyze bilateral oligopoly. In so
doing, they motivate use of the Shapley value. As their environment presumes that there are no competitive
externalities, our bargaining game can be viewed as providing a non-cooperative foundation for their
approach and a demonstration of how this would extend to an environment where downstream firms
compete with one another.
23 To clarify, there are still externalities between negotiations in that an agreement by one pair impacts upon
upstream costs faced in another. However, we demonstrate that such externalities are internalized.13
products.
24 As will be demonstrated, this case allows us to isolate the impact of vertical 
integration on each agent’s bargaining position – holding efficiency considerations fixed.
3.1 Non-Integration
To build intuition, we first examine the case of non-integration when there is 
upstream competition. Under non-integration, all four assets are separately owned by
their respective managers, who can potentially negotiate with any vertically related
manager. As we will see, this is not the case under integration.
Given the assumption of passive beliefs we can solve for the equilibrium payoffs
of each agent. Moreover, we can demonstrate that the outcome is efficient in that industry
profits are maximized.
Proposition 1. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs,
 are such that  1212 (, ,, AA BB qqqq )) 1 11 2 22 12 12 (,) (, ) (, ) (, AB AB AA A BB B qq qq c qq c qq SS   is
maximized. Each agent receives their payoff as given in Table 1. 
The proof is in the appendix. Notice that this result is independent of the precise ordering 
of pairs in sequential negotiations.
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The intuition for efficiency is subtle, given the interactions between the
negotiations of each pair of agents. As depicted in Figure 2(a), under non-integration, 
there are potentially four pairs of negotiations. Each negotiation involves Nash 
bargaining where the pair chooses their respective supply quantity to maximize their 
bilateral payoff. For example, UA and D1 would choose   to maximize: 1A q
11 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 (,) (, ) AB B A A AA A A qq p p c qq S  )   )   (1) 
while 1A p   would satisfy: 
24 This case has been a common focus of the literature on strategic vertical integration (Bolton and
Whinston, 1993), the role of exclusive contracts (see, for example, Segal and Whinston, 2000) as well as
competition in buyer-seller networks (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Kranton and Minehart, 2001). In work
contemporary with the present paper, Inderst and Wey (2003) and Bjornerstedt and Stennek (2001) also
provide an analysis of the no competitive externalities case under conditions of bilateral oligopoly.
25 We could weaken that passive beliefs requirement and consider ‘wary beliefs.’ In this case, parties
anticipate that later negotiation behavior will be adjusted according to deviations in earlier negotiations.
(see McAfee and Schwartz, 1994). This weaker assumption, however, does not result in the same outcome
as passive beliefs when there are competitive externalities. In that case, the order of negotiations does
matter, complicating considerably the notational complexity of the paper but without any change in the
qualitative results regarding vertical integration.14
11 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 (,) (, ) AB A B A A A AA A A qq p p p p c qq S  )    )    (2) 
where  and  ij ) ji )  represent the payoffs Di and Uj expect to receive in the renegotiation
subgame triggered by a breakdown in their negotiations; by subgame perfection, these are 
taken as given. The remaining pricing terms either form the subject of a previous
agreement earlier in the bargaining sequence (in which case their terms are given by the 
assumption of passive beliefs) or anticipate the negotiations of pairs further in the 
sequence. In that case, we can demonstrate that when anticipated outcomes are 
substituted into (1), the only term involving  , taking into account the envelope 
theorem, is a linear function of
1A q
11 1 1 2 (,) (, AB AA A qq c qq ) S  . Thus,   is always chosen to 
maximize industry profits. 
1A q
In terms of distribution, the equilibrium payoffs in Table 1 are obtained by 
resolving the equivalent of (2) for all pairs and all subgames. They represent the Shapley 
values of each respective agent given the allocation of assets among them.
26 While other 
analyses of bilateral oligopoly have derived Shapley value outcomes using axiomatic
bargaining treatments ours is based on an explicit extensive form. In addition, while we
demonstrated in the Appendix that the equilibrium is equivalent to situations (such as 
assumed by Inderst and Wey (2003)) that require supply agreements to specify pricing 
arrangements that would arise for every industry configuration, this interpretation is not
unique. The same outcome arises when we do not allow negotiating agents to commit to 
supply arrangements contingent on exit or the severing of any supply relationship in the 
industry.
What is most significant about this distribution is its coalitional form; where each 
agent’s payoff depends on industry profits generated under various alternative supply 
configurations. Thus, if, say, there is a breakdown between UA and D1, bargaining 
proceeds between the remaining pairs on the basis that no supply can occur between
them. Interestingly, as was noted by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for the cooperative 
game context, only certain types of supply configurations actually enter into the resulting 
26 This mirrors the finding of SZ. A similar type of result drives Stole and Zwiebel (1998). Their paper
considers the impact of a horizontal merger amongst non-competing firms on intra-firm bargaining with
workers. A horizontal merger means that workers connected previously to one another through two firms,
will be connected directly to the merged entity. Stole and Zwiebel (1998) show that this may improve or
harm their bargaining position depending upon the nature of cost savings from the merger.15
payoff. Specifically, supply configurations where one supply relationship has been 
severed but otherwise all firms remain connected (in a graph-theoretic sense) do not
appear in payoffs; those terms are relevant in bargaining off the equilibrium path but 
cancel out in the equilibrium payoffs because of the game’s recursive structure. This 
simplifies the form of the payoffs and eliminates the need to make strong assumptions
about outcomes where links between groups of agents are only partially severed.
3.2 Vertical Integration
Vertical integration involves a change in asset ownership between an upstream 
and a downstream manager. We will focus here on vertical integration between UA and 
D1. This may involve forward integration (FI) whereby UA acquires D1’s assets or 
backward integration (BI) where UA’s assets are acquired by D1.
27 In each case, as in the 
property rights literature, the acquirer becomes the residual claimant to the earnings of an 
asset and has residual control rights as to what it is used for (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990). However, each manager continues to be essential for the
productive use of the asset. 
To illustrate what changes in ownership mean in the present context, suppose UA
integrates forward by purchasing D1’s assets. The manager of the acquired D1 receives a 
transfer payment, , while the profits from its asset, 1A t
11 1 1 1 (,) AB A B qq t p S    , accrue to the 
new owner, UA.
28 Importantly, as depicted in Figure 2(b), UA rather than D1 negotiates a 
supply agreement with UB for the supply of inputs to D1. This is because the residual 
control rights of the downstream asset have been transferred to UA. Thus, in the event of a 
breakdown in negotiations between UA and the manager of D1, no supply will occur 
between UB and D1.
27 There is a third option characterized by some form of joint ownership. As there is an issue with regard to 
how that form of ownership might operate in this setting (see Bolton and Whinston, 1993), we do not
consider it here.
28 Note that while it may be possible to offer the manager of the acquired asset a share of the profits of the
merged entity, as long as this is less than 50 percent, it is reasonable to suppose that the new owner has 
residual control rights. This means that agent can exclude the old owner and anyone else from access to the 
asset. Thus, the old owner’s compensation will be up for negotiation. As shown clearly by Aghion and
Tirole (1994), this renders the equity of the old owner irrelevant in terms of the payoffs each receives.
Hence, we adopt the convention here of modeling a transfer of ownership as a complete transfer of equity
to the new owner.16
What this means is that a breakdown between UA and the manager of D1 has a 
deeper impact upon UB and D2. While, under non-integration, such a breakdown would 
still mean that D1 could continue to receive inputs from UB, under FI, this would no 
longer occur. In this case, UB would be left with D2 as its sole source of demand. FI thus 
eliminates the possibility of UB being the only supplier of D1, thereby weakening its 
bargaining power. For the same reason, FI improves the bargaining position of D2 as it 
increases the chances it will not have to compete with D1 for UB’s input. 
In this environment, it can be demonstrated – along the same lines as in the proof 
of Proposition 1 – that integration (BI or FI) will only affect the distribution of surplus 
between agents and not the overall surplus generated. As in non-integration, this occurs 
because, under passive beliefs, each negotiating pair chooses its respective quantity in a 
way that does not impact on the pricing and quantity terms of other negotiations. Thus,
the supply quantities chosen continue to maximize industry profits. 
The payoffs contained in Table 1 show how distribution changes following 
integration. The critical feature to note about the effect of integration is that it rules out 
the participation of an asset’s manager in a coalition that does not include the owner. 
When UA owns D1 (that is, forward integration FI), the payoff 12 ( B DDU 3 ) becomes
2 ( B DU 3 ), and the payoff  1 ( B DU 3 )  becomes 0. When D1 owns UA (that is, backward
integration BI), the payoff 2 () A B DU U 3  becomes 2 ( B DU 3 ), and the payoff  2 () A DU 3
becomes 0. In each case, integration diminishes the bargaining position of one or both of 
the non-integrated firms and, as is depicted in the last two rows of Table 1, this raises UA
and D1’s joint payoff from integration over non-integration by 

1
12 2 6 () ( B DDU DU 3 3 ) B  for FI and  
1
2 6 () ( AB B DU U DU 3 3 2 )  for BI.
Comparing these two changes in payoffs, notice that FI will be chosen over BI if
and only if  12 2 () ( B ) AB D DU DU U 3! 3. That is, FI is favoured as an instrument for 
improving joint bargaining power precisely when upstream firms are closer substitutes
than downstream firms.
29 In other words, the acquiring firm comes from the more
29 Upstream firms are closer substitutes when
2 () (
2 )
A B DUU DU 3o 3
j  while downstream firms are closer 
substitutes (in the eyes of upstream firms) when
12 () ( )
A iA DDU DU 3o 3 . This does not, however, mean17
competitive vertical segment. This is because integration eliminates an option for the
acquirer’s competitor, an option that is valuable precisely because firms in the other
vertical segment are not close substitutes from their perspective (and therefore that 
segment is less competitive). For example, forward integration means that UB loses an 
option to supply both downstream firms and this loss is costly when supplying both is 
relatively valuable. Consequently, the non-integrating firm that suffers the greatest harm 
from integration is the firm that is in the same segment as the acquiring firm (i.e., D2
under BI and UB under FI). 
Importantly, our results here generalize HT’s ‘scarce needs’ and ‘scarce supplies’
motives for vertical integration, by allowing for upstream costs to lie between the 
extremes of constant and backwards L-shaped marginal costs. To see this, observe that 
when upstream marginal costs are constant and symmetric (that is, there are ‘scarce
needs’ as industry supply is perfectly elastic), D1 and UA have no incentive for BI but a 
positive incentive for FI. In this case, D2’s payoff is unchanged and rents shift entirely
from UB. In contrast, when upstream firms are capacity constrained and downstream 
firms are perfectly substitutable
30 (that is, there are ‘scarce supplies’), there is no 
incentive for FI but a positive incentive for BI. In that case, it is UB’s payoff that is 
unchanged by integration with the impact being borne entirely by D2. This accords with 
the general findings of HT.
31 However, we have derived these motives for vertical 
integration in a model where bargaining position is determined by the characteristics of 
possible breakdown market structures rather than an exogenous parameter. We
demonstrate below that these motives are preserved when competitive externalities are 
considered.
j
that downstream firms sell products that are close substitutes from a consumer perspective. It might simply
mean that upstream firms have convex cost technologies.
30 In the no externalities case, this would arise if  /
ii q S ww  were constant for any quantity smaller than total
upstream capacity. In HT, they assume that downstream outputs are perfect substitutes that also make those
firms perfect substitutes. We consider this case in Section 4 below.
31 Strictly speaking, while HT find that only D2 is harmed under ‘scarce supplies,’ in their ‘scarce needs’
model both non-integrated firms were harmed by integration. In our model, when upstream costs lie
between these two extremes, we also find the both D2 and UB are harmed by integration. 18
3.3 Upstream Monopoly 
As the focus of this paper is the change in the effect of vertical integration as 
upstream competition is introduced, we need to take care in specifying the upstream 
monopoly case.
32 In particular, we require the set of productive assets in the industry to 
be the same between the two cases as well as the characteristics of any human capital. 
This means that we cannot simply take the two upstream assets and combine them under 
a single owner, as one of the assets will be managed by an individual with important 
human capital. As with vertical integration, that agent cannot be replaced and so will 
have some bargaining power in negotiations with the owner of upstream assets. 
The only difference between the outcomes under upstream monopoly as 
compared with upstream competition is in the distribution of the surplus between agents. 
Industry profits are maximized under the same logic as Proposition 1 and these profits are 
the same as under upstream competition, as the characteristics of resources in the industry 
are unchanged. In contrast, the payoffs of individual agents – listed in Table 1 – are 
different under upstream monopoly. 
The negotiating relationships for upstream monopoly are depicted in Figure 3(a). 
In comparison with the upstream competition case, there are only three relevant 
negotiations as there is only a single firm negotiating the supply of inputs to downstream 
firms. What this means is that if negotiations between the upstream monopolist (chosen 
to be UA) and a downstream firm break down, the downstream firm exits the industry. 
As before, we consider vertical integration between UA and D1. The changed 
bargaining relationships are depicted in Figures 3(b) and 3(c) for the cases of forward and 
backwards integration, respectively. Notice that, under forward integration, the change in 
residual control rights implies no change in the bargaining relationships. This means that 
forward integration will yield exactly the same payoffs as non-integration. 
In contrast, the changes in bargaining relationships under backwards integration 
are quite extensive (see Figure 3(c)). In this situation, D1 purchases UA’s assets. This 
makes D1 the owner of its assets and those of UA and UB. It will negotiate with both of 
32 All of the results regarding vertical integration in this sub-section would similarly hold if we had a 
downstream monopsony rather than upstream monopoly. There would, however, be a difference in results 
when we include competitive externalities downstream. 19
those managers. Hence, backwards integration allows some market structures to be 
possible relative to the non-integration case. In particular, it is now possible for D1 to rely
solely on supply from UB, because UB’s manager can still supply D1 if negotiations break 
down between D1 and UA’s manager. The implication is that BI may improve UB’s
bargaining position.
33
Backward integration is preferred to the status quo — or, equivalently, FI — if
21 () ( 2 ) A BB D UU DD U 3! 3 ; this is the same condition as under upstream competition. In 
other words, BI is preferable if upstream assets are relatively less substitutable than
downstream assets. Otherwise, BI may not be privately desirable as it improves the
bargaining power of UB whose productive role is otherwise similar to UA. Thus, as in the 
upstream competition case, the acquiring firm comes from the segment that is relatively
competitive and not from the monopoly segment as is the presumption of conventional 
wisdom.
3.4 Comparison of Upstream Competition and Upstream Monopoly 
We are now in a position to compare the incentives for vertical integration in
upstream monopoly with those for upstream competition, based on pure bargaining 
effects. Recall that the payoff to FI relative to BI is determined by the same condition in 
upstream monopoly and upstream competition; so we can look at FI and BI in turn, using 
the results in Table 1.
For FI, the comparison is clear: there is no incentive for FI under upstream 
monopoly, but a positive incentive for FI under upstream competition. FI confers
additional market power on the upstream firm, by ruling out options for the other 
upstream firm; but under upstream monopoly, this has already been achieved. 
For BI, it is easy to see that it too will improve the joint payoff to UA and D1 by 
more under upstream competition than under upstream monopoly, as 
12 2 () ( B ) B D DU DU 3t 3 . BI eliminates the possibility of a D2 monopsony facing the 
upstream firms. Under upstream competition, BI also increases the chance of a bilateral 
33 For example, when UA and UB are perfect substitutes (i.e., symmetric with linear costs), UB obtains no
rents under non-integration and positive rents under backwards integration.20
monopoly between UB and D2, whereas under upstream monopoly the possibility of a UB
monopoly is reintroduced. 
Thus, from a pure bargaining perspective, integration has a higher private return 
under upstream competition than under upstream monopoly. The reason for this is that 
the benefits of integration flow from harming agents outside of the proposed merger, 
thereby redistributing rents in favour of the insiders. Under upstream monopoly, outsiders 
either do not have their bargaining position change, or in some cases can potentially 
improve their negotiating relationships with insiders. For upstream competition, 
integration always removes possible market structures that may have been of benefit to 
outsiders. Hence, the incentive for integration is stronger under upstream competition. If 
vertical integration involved a fixed cost (in terms of foregone investment, or transactions 
costs), integration would be more likely under upstream competition.
34
4 Competitive Externalities 
The previous section demonstrates that incentives for strategic vertical integration 
can be higher under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. In the no 
externalities case, however, production is unchanged following integration so industry 
profits are always maximized. Integration served only to change distribution in ways that 
were different, depending upon the degree of upstream competition. When there are 
competitive externalities, the distributional (or bargaining) consequences of vertical 
integration are largely identical. What differs is the level of production, meaning that 
integration has welfare consequences. As we demonstrate in this section, vertical 
integration can lead to higher downstream prices and increased deadweight losses, as in 
the contracting externalities literature. Critically, however, the industry profits generated 
by vertical integration differ between upstream competition and monopoly. In this 
section, we explore how upstream competition affects the welfare losses from integration. 
34 Given that the payoffs of at least one non-integrated firm is reduced by integration, there is also a 
possibility that integration may induce exit. In this case, there will be a direct welfare consequence of 
integration. In HT exit is the only way in which distribution effects can occur. Instead, here we have 
provided a context in which exit does not occur (i.e., there are no fixed costs) but distributional effects from 
vertical integration still arise 21
4.1 Total Surplus 
The contracting externalities literature typically considers a monopolist selling to 
downstream firms producing identical goods.
35 The monopolist makes take-it-or-leave-it 
offers to each firm in turn. If it were to sell the profit-maximizing quantity to the first, it 
would have an incentive to “secretly discount” (i.e., sell more than the profit-maximizing
quantity, at a discount) to other downstream firms, as those later offers would not 
internalize any externality imposed on contracts already signed. For this reason, firms
will not accept a contract consistent with industry profit maximization. If prices and
quantities are unobservable, and if agents hold passive beliefs, implying that they do not 
revise their beliefs about prices and quantities in other contracts when they observe 
behavior that is off the equilibrium path, the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium is for the
monopolist to offer Cournot quantities to all firms. In other words, each negotiating pair 
maximizes their profits, taking the negotiated quantity in the other agreement as given.
36
A similar set of outcomes arises in our bargaining environment. Bilateral Nash 
bargaining implies that each   is chosen to maximize ij q (.) (.) ij c S  , taking as given 
quantities chosen in other negotiations (by passive beliefs). When there were no 
competitive externalities, this choice did not impact upon the outcome of other 
negotiations; therefore each choice maximized industry profits. Similarly, in market
structures where only one downstream firm is present, industry profits will still be 
maximized, as there are no competitive externalities. However, total industry profits will 
not be maximized overall when both downstream firms are present, as each negotiation 
imposes externalities on others. Let  ˆ (.) 3  represent equilibrium industry profits in that 
case. The following proposition summarises the equilibrium outcome:
Proposition 2. There exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs, 
under non-integration, regardless of whether there is upstream competition or monopoly, 
in which  12 ˆ () A B D DU U 3 , 12 ˆ () A D DU 3  and  12 ˆ ( B) D DU 3  are at their Cournot duopoly 
levels when upstream inputs are supplied on the basis of industry upstream marginal 
cost. For all other industry configurations,  ˆ (.) (.) 3  3.
35 See HT, Rey and Tirole (1997), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
36 The role of passive beliefs here is to neutralize the effect of bargaining order on outcomes (McAfee and
Schwartz, 1994).22
As we do not rule out quantity commitments, our model yields the same conclusion 
reached in the contracting externalities literature, that under passive beliefs, Cournot 
outcomes will result. What is interesting here is that this is achieved despite the fact that
there are two independently owned upstream assets, yielding the same outcome as an 
upstream monopoly where both assets are commonly owned.
37 Interestingly, this implies
that an upstream (horizontal) merger does not change retail prices and welfare 
downstream in this setting.
38 Because there is no negotiation involving residual claimants
on the returns of both downstream assets, there is no negotiation in which the impact of a
supply choice on both downstream firms is considered. Instead, in each negotiation the 
quantity supplied to one downstream firm is chosen holding supply to the other constant 
– yielding a Cournot equilibrium.
EXAMPLE: Suppose that both downstream firms face linear demand, 
1( ) ( ) ii A i Bi A pq qq q iB J       (1 J t ) and have cost functions 
 (with 1
2 (,) ( ) ii Ai B i A i B cq q q q T   0 T tt) while upstream firms (j = A or B) have 
symmetric cost functions, . The unique equilibrium under both 
upstream competition and monopoly involves both downstream firms being supplied 
2
12 12 () ( jj j j j cq q q q   )
1
82 ˆij q J     by both upstream firms, generating profits of  2
4
12 (4 )
ˆ () AB DDUU
J  3  ; greater
than the fully integrated monopoly outcome of 
* 1
84 ij q J     with  1
12 42 () AB DDUU J  3  .
Similarly, in this situation, 2
2(3 )
12 (6 2 )




 3   with  1
62 ˆij q TJ     .
What happens when D1 and UA integrate? First, as in the no externality case, this
eliminates certain market structures depending upon whether there has been FI or BI. 
Second, for those market structures that remain possible, equilibrium industry profits are 
unchanged for all market structures where one or more of D1, D2 and UA are not present.
That is, a change in equilibrium profits following integration requires the presence of 
both D1 and UA, and it is only where D2 is also present that industry profits are not 
necessarily maximized under non-integration and integration alike.
Third, the impact on equilibrium outcomes from integration is the same under
37 That is, suppose, as do HT, that both upstream firms have constant marginal costs but that UB’s is higher
than UA’s. In this case, under upstream monopoly, UA would never choose to supply using the other
upstream asset. And under upstream competition, the Cournot equilibrium would involve supply purely
from UA and none from UB. As we demonstrate below, however, in contrast to the conclusion of HT, UB
may still be paid in equilibrium.23
both BI and FI. In each case, integration implies that the residual claimant on the profits
of D1 is the one negotiating the supply from UA to D2. Under both FI and BI, in 
negotiations over q2A, the negotiated supply quantity maximizes 12 (.) (.) (.) A c SS . This 
is because the residual claimant on D1’s profits negotiates with D2 over the supply from 
UA to D2. Nonetheless, negotiations that are internal to the integrated firm will still 
involve supply quantities chosen to maximize (.) (.) ij c S  . D2 does not participate in 
those negotiations and hence, the impact on its profits is not considered. 
Fourth, there is a difference between the impact of integration in the upstream
competition and monopoly cases. Under upstream competition, negotiations over 
will still maximize
2B q
2(.) (.) B c S   whereas, under upstream monopoly, 
2 21 2 ˆ argmax (.) (.) (.)
B Bq q B c SS   . The fact that competitive externalities are 
internalized in two negotiations rather than one suggests that integration will allow an 
upstream monopolist to more easily restrict output and raise prices downstream. Given 
the general nature of profit and cost functions (and potential asymmetries between firms)
assumed thus far, it is not possible to provide a simple proof of this. 
Nonetheless, by imposing further restrictions, we can characterise the effects of
integration on industry profits explicitly.
Proposition 3. Let   and   denote industry profits in any perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium with passive beliefs under integration by D
ˆ ˆ (.) UC 3 ˆ ˆ (.) UM 3
1 and UA, for upstream 
competition and monopoly respectively. Assume that (1) D1 and D2 are symmetric and 
are indifferent to the source of supply; (2) each cj has symmetric and weakly concave 
isoquants (for given total cost) in  12 (, ) j j qq . Then, 
(i) Industry profits are unchanged following integration under upstream competition;
i.e., 12 12
ˆ ˆˆ () () UC A B A B D DU U DDUU 3  3 ;
(ii) If D1 and D2 sell products that are perfect substitutes, then all externalities are 
internalized under market structures with an upstream monopoly; i.e., 
12 12
ˆ ˆ () () U M AB AB D DU U DDU U 3  3  and  12 12 12
ˆˆ ˆˆ () () () UM A UC A A D DU DDU DDU 3  3  3 .
Proposition 3 provides a sharp characterization of the outcomes in an environment where 
upstream competition is very strong (as upstream inputs are perfectly substitutable from 
the point of view of downstream firms). The concavity of upstream cost isoquants means
38 If there were externalities amongst upstream firms, this would no longer be the case. 24
that it is (weakly) cost minimizing for each upstream firm to supply a single downstream 
firm, under non-integration as well as integration.
39 In the presence of upstream 
competition, therefore, all integration does is change supply relations, without changing 
the actual production or surplus generated.
40 This leads to the interesting result that if a 
dedicated supply flow is optimal, there is no change in industry profits following 
integration (Result (i)).
41
When downstream firms are perfect substitutes, we can further characterize the 
results. When there is an upstream monopolist– either UA and UB are owned by the same 
manager, or UB has exited the market following breakdowns in negotiation, leaving UA
alone in the market –integration leads to foreclosure of the non-integrated firm, D2. The 
monopoly quantity is supplied to D1, and profits are thereby maximized.
42 It is important 
to note, however, that while it appears that foreclosure occurs here – as the independent 
downstream firm receives no inputs from its integrated rival – this does not necessarily 
mean that it receives no payment integrated firm; a point we discuss in more detail when 
we consider the distribution of surplus below.
43
When D1 and D2 are not perfect substitutes, upstream firms reduce their supply to 
D2 but do not necessarily foreclose. This is precisely the monopolization effect from 
integration first identified by HT that arises because the integrated firm internalizes its 
own competitive externality when negotiating with outside parties. Industry profits are 
not perfectly maximized, in general, because the integrated firm does not take into 
account the externality it imposes on D2; something borne out in our running example. 
When it comes to integration under upstream competition, however, the impact of 
integration on overall profits is, in general, ambiguous. The main reason for this is that, 
while an upstream monopolist will necessarily take actions that realize productive 
39 Proposition 2 demonstrates that cost minimization is achieved in equilibrium. 
40 HT’s ex post monopolization case similarly found that there was no increase in industry profits following 
integration. This was because their case is a special case of Proposition 3 with linear isoquants. 
41 This also assists in comparing our results to those of other models in the literature. For instance, Chen 
(2001) assumes that there are switching costs associated with changing from dedicated suppliers. This 
means that inputs are not perfect substitutes for downstream firms; hence, integration has an impact on 
industry profits in Chen’s model. 
42 Proposition 3 is stated more strongly than necessary, on this point: no assumptions on upstream firms are 
necessary. It is only necessary for downstream firms to be perfect substitutes. 
43 HT also find similar supply flows and industry profit outcomes as in Proposition 3. However, as will be 
discussed below, we do not find that this means that D2 is foreclosed in the traditional sense and forced to 25
efficiency for upstream supply, there is no similar control in upstream competition. While 
this did not matter under non-integration, by creating incentives for UA to reduce its
supply to D2, integration creates the opposite incentives for UB, who wants to expand 
supply to D2. If downstream firms care about the source of input supply (i.e., do not view 
outputs from UA and UB as perfect substitutes), then these changes can increase industry
costs and lead to a reduction in profits; a possibility we demonstrate in our running
example below.
EXAMPLE (Continued): When 0 T    (downstream firms are indifferent as to the source of 
input supply), vertical integration does not change the equilibrium outcome under 
upstream competition (as this involved each upstream firm supplying a single
downstream firm); although UA will be the sole supplier of D1 (thus, 
12 12
ˆ ˆˆ () ( UC A B A B) D DU U DDUU 3  3 ). For upstream monopoly, as all supply is controlled 
by the owner of D1, the impact of any supply to D2 on D1’s profits will be internalised for
that decision. In addition, it is easy to confirm that both downstream firms will continue
to be supplied (each from one downstream asset); although there will be a contraction of 
supply to D2 relative to the non-integrated case (thus, 
23
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 3  ).
When 0 T ! , integration changes industry profits under both upstream monopoly
and upstream competition. In each case, there is an overall reduction in output with D1
having a higher output than D2. The following Figure 4(a) shows what happens to 
industry profits when  1
2 T    and Figure 4(b) shows what happens to consumer surplus. 
Note that  12 12 12
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ () () ( UM A B A B UC A B
ˆ ) D DU U DDU U DDU U 3! 3 ! 3  (for T high enough) 
while for consumer surplus non-integration provides the best outcome and integration by 
an upstream monopolist is the worst. Overall total welfare follows the consumer surplus 
ranking. Nonetheless, consumers in D1’s (D2’s) market are better (worse) off under 
integration with an upstream monopoly than the upstream competition case. 
Figure 4
(a) Industry Profits  (b) Consumer Surplus
44
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exit the industry.
44 Defined as the unweighted sum of consumer surplus generated from both downstream products.26
4.2 Distribution
In solving for the equilibrium payoffs under competitive externalities, there arises
the important issue of what SZ term ‘feasibility.’ An equilibrium is feasible if there is no
incentive for an individual party to precipitate a breakdown in any negotiating pair at any 
stage (i.e., in any market structure that might have emerged). Under competitive
externalities feasibility cannot be guaranteed. 
To see this, consider a situation where a single upstream firm, UA, is negotiating
with two non-integrated downstream firms. If both negotiating pairs agree then they
divide up  12 ˆ () A D DU 3  with: 

1
12 1 2 6 ˆ 2 ( )( )( )
A UA A vD D U D U D   3 3 3 A U ,
 1
1
12 1 2 6 ˆ 2( ) ( )2( ) DA A v DDU DU DU  3  3  3 A ,
 2
1
12 1 2 6 ˆ 2( )2( ) ( ) DA A v DDU DU DU  3  3  3 A .
However, suppose that UA negotiated with D1 followed by D2, then by refusing to 
negotiate with D1 and causing an eventual breakdown, UA would receive  1
2 2 () A DU 3
from an agreement with D2 alone. If 
1
21 1 2 ˆ ()() ( 2 ) A AA D UD U D D 3 3! 3 U , both UA and 
D1 would prefer a breakdown to an agreement and hence, an equilibrium involving both 
downstream firms being active would not be possible. Observe that this preference would 
not occur in the absence of externalities; hence feasibility is not an issue in that case.
Importantly, note that, in contrast to other papers on competitive externalities
such as Hart and Tirole (1990), Rey and Tirole (2003) and Chemla (2003), we allow the 
upstream firm to exclude one downstream firm or the other. What constrains the 
incentive to exclude, however, is that after triggering a breakdown the upstream firm
would face only a single downstream firm, with greater bargaining power as a result. The 
upstream firm trades off competitive externalities against the loss in bargaining power.
For the remainder of this paper, we will assume that the feasibility conditions hold 
regardless of the level of integration. Nonetheless, in the appendix, we provide the 
conditions for feasibility to hold in our model (including our running example).
Given feasibility, we can demonstrate the following: 27
Proposition 4. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs, each firm receives
the payoffs listed in Table 2. 
The payoffs in Table 2 are particularly interesting: they are not classical Shapley values.
First, surplus is not maximized because payoffs reflect the presence of externalities. 
Second, the distribution of the surplus generated does not take a Shapley form. For
example, payoffs are a function of  12 ˆ (, ) A B DUD U 3 , the profit earned by UA and D1
jointly when UA supplies D1, and they face competing supply in the downstream market
from D2, supplied by UB. In contrast, Shapley values do not allow one’s payoff to depend 
on the configuration of players that one is not cooperating with.
45 In effect these payoffs
are allowing for the effect of competitive externalities. Notice that when there are no 
externalities, the payoffs in Table 2 collapse to Shapley values (as in Table 1); that is, 
profits are maximized under all market structures and, say,  12 1 ˆ (, ) ( BA ) B DUD U D U 3  3 .
Notice, however, that the Shapley value-type solution arises naturally in the
upstream monopoly case. In that situation, UB can never produce independently of UA, so 
the types of partitions that arise for the upstream competition case are ruled out. Thus,
competitive externalities do not change the payoffs of each agent under upstream 
monopoly; save for the fact that industry profits are not maximized where both 
downstream firms are present.
4.3 Comparing Incentives for FI and BI 
In Section 3, we asked whether the acquiring firm in vertical integration would 
come from the more or less competitive vertical segment. From Table 2, we can see that
FI will be preferred to BI, under either upstream competition or monopoly, if and only if 
12 2 ˆ () ( B ) AB D DU DU U 3t 3. This corresponds to the comparison made for the no 
externalities case except that here the left hand side takes into account the fact that when 
downstream outputs are substitutes in the eyes of consumers, industry profits will be 
lower as a result of their competition. Indeed, the more substitutable are downstream 
45 The payoffs here are related to cooperative games in partition function form (see Myerson (1980) for a 
discussion). The precise relationship of the payoffs here with cooperative game theory is an item for future
research.28
outputs in the eyes of consumers (intensifying Cournot competition under non-
integration), the more likely it is that a downstream firm will acquire upstream assets.
Hence, our conclusion that the acquirer will come from the more competitive vertical
segment is strengthened when there are competitive externalities.
At this stage it is also instructive to consider the relative impacts of FI and BI on 
outsiders. Recall that, in general, analyses of the anticompetitive effects of vertical
integration have not distinguished between the type of integration. While our analysis 
demonstrates that FI and BI have the same impact on total surplus, it also highlights their
differential impact on bargaining positions; especially for outsiders.
The following table lists the benefits to outsiders from integration by D1 and UA
for a situation where upstream and downstream firms are symmetric and the conditions of 
Proposition 3 hold. In that case, FI always improves D2’s payoff, whether the acquirer of 
D1 is an upstream competitor or monopolist. Essentially, any reduction in bargaining 
position is outweighed by the potential increase in industry profits. Thus, it is BI that 
would raise concerns for exit by D2; indeed, when there are no competitive externalities,
D2’s payoff is reduced by BI. In contrast, from upstream competition, FI reduces UB’s
payoff; causing more concern regarding its potential exit than would be the case for BI. 
Thus, the FI-BI distinction can matter for antitrust analysis if potential exit of an outsider 
is an issue for evaluation.
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4.4 Comparing Upstream Competition and Monopoly 
The central question being considered in this paper is whether it is indeed the case 
that there is more incentive for vertical integration when there is upstream monopoly
rather than upstream competition. When there are no competitive externalities, we 
concluded that due to pure bargaining effects, the greatest potential for purely strategic
vertical integration arose under upstream competition rather than upstream monopoly.
When there are competitive externalities, vertical integration involves a 
monopolization effect and consequent welfare harm. In the special case of Proposition 3, 
this effect was stronger when there was a vertically integrated upstream monopolist rather 
than an upstream competitor. Nonetheless, using Table 2, we can compare the incentives
for welfare-reducing vertical integration in each case.
Proposition 5. The increase in the joint payoff of D1 and UA from both FI and BI under 
upstream competition will exceed that achieved under upstream monopoly if and only if 

1
12 2 12 12 3
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ () ( )( ) ( B B U M AB U C AB ) D DU DU DDUU DDUU 3 3 t 3  3 .
The left hand side of the inequality in the proposition comes from the fact that the 
bargaining effect from vertical integration is stronger under upstream competition than 
monopoly. On the other hand, an upstream monopoly is able to use vertical integration 
more effectively to increase industry profits; thus, the monopolization effect weakens the
relative incentives of an upstream competitor to vertically integrate.
Propositions 3 and 5 demonstrate that if downstream firms sell perfectly 
substitutable products, the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of upstream
competition on the incentive to integrate is likely (although not guaranteed) to hold. In 
that case, the left hand side of the inequality in Proposition 5 is at its lowest while the 
right hand-side is at its highest possible level; as the upstream monopolist can achieve an 
industry monopoly outcome when it integrates while under upstream competition,
integration leaves industry profits unchanged.
Nonetheless, as downstream products become less substitutable, it is likely that 
the reverse will be the case. Indeed, we know (from Section 3) that in the extreme – 
where downstream firms operate in separate markets – there is a greater incentive to
integrate under upstream competition. This suggests that as the degree of downstream30
product differentiation becomes sufficiently high, the conventional wisdom will be 
overturned. For our running example we can demonstrate that this is indeed the case.
EXAMPLE (Continued): Figure 5 illustrates the difference between the incentives for 
vertical integration (i.e., improvement to joint surplus relative to non-integration) under 
upstream competition less those under upstream monopoly. Note that the lower the 
degree of product differentiation, the lower is the relative incentive under upstream 
competition.
Figure 5: Differences in the Payoff Increase from Integration under Upstream 
Competition and Monopoly 
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4.5 Integration and Foreclosure 
It is worth emphasizing that the foreclosure effects of integration on non-
integrated firms differ in a subtle but important way from previous studies. An interesting 
feature of the upstream monopoly case is that, under the assumption of perfect symmetry
and substitutability upstream and downstream, vertical integration leads to the monopoly
output industry-wide. In that case, D2 is not supplied any inputs and hence, does not 
produce, leaving D1 to supply the monopoly quantity downstream. However, under FI, D2
does receive a payoff of:
 2
1
12 12 () ( ) ( ) DA B vF I D D U U D U  3  3 ij.
46
The reason for this is that even though D2 plays no actual productive role, it does provide
the integrated firm owner (in its internal negotiations under FI) an outside option in case 
46 Note that, under BI, for this example, feasibility is not satisfied for negotiations with D2, who would
prefer to exit the industry.31
of a bargaining breakdown with D1.
47 Thus, while there is technical foreclosure in terms 
of the elimination of downstream competition, UA still cedes rents to D2 so as to improve 
its bargaining position with respect to D1’s manager.
48
5 Counter-Mergers 
To date, our analysis has focused on consideration of the incentives and effects of 
a single vertical merger between UA and D1. While this might be appropriate in situations 
where merger opportunities are limited (for instance, due to a need for technological or 
organizational compatibility or some other legal restraint), in other situations the 
possibility of a counter-merger remains and such mergers are observed (Chandler, 1964; 
Scherer and Ross, 1990). 
Two related issues arise in this regard. First, are participants to a counter-merger 
reacting to the initial merger or would they have chosen this course independently? That 
is, is there a bandwagon effect associated with vertical integration? Second, does the 
possibility of a counter-merger alter the incentives for the initial merger? We analyze 
each of these questions in turn. As the possibility of a counter-merger is most salient 
when rival firms are similarly placed to the initial merging parties, we will assume 
throughout this section that upstream and downstream firms are symmetric.
49
47 A lump sum payment from upstream firms to D2, without any corresponding input supply, might be seen 
as strange. The solution here can be approximated, however, by some arbitrarily small input supply to D2.
48 When upstream firms have constant costs (as in HT’s ‘Ex Post Monopolization’ variant) but, say, UA’s
costs are lower than UB’s, then UB does not supply either downstream firm under non-integration or 
integration. However, while in HT, this implies that UB receives no payoff, here that is only the case under 
upstream monopoly. Under upstream competition, so long as UB is not too inefficient, UB receives a 
payment from D1 (or the integrated firm) so as it improve its bargaining position in the event of an internal 
breakdown. However, it always receives a payment from D2. Hence, even with FI, UB may not wish to exit 
the industry. This result is very similar to SZ who find that a firm will employ more workers than would be 
efficient in order to reduce the bargaining position of all its workers. Here, however, will an essentially 
inactive firm might receive a payment, it is not in the payer’s interest to require that firm produce. In the SZ 
case, it remains in the interests of the firm to utilise all employed workers. If a pool of inactive, 
replacement workers was available this would change the SZ result (see de Fontenay and Gans, 2003a). 
49 This assumption is made for simplicity of exposition. We derive all proofs of results in this section in 
Appendix C without this assumption. 32
5.1 Are there bandwagon effects from vertical integration? 
Here we explore whether an initial merger may encourage or discourage further 
mergers. One measure of this type of interrelationship is to compare the follow-on
incentive for a merger (that is, the increase in joint payoff for, say, UB and D2 if their
merger follows that of UA and D1) with their incentive for a stand-alone merger
(presuming that UA and D1 remain vertically separated). As will be demonstrated when 
we look at the full equilibrium below, if the follow-on incentive for a merger is greater 
than the stand-alone incentive, we can conclude that positive bandwagon effects exist; 
that is, an initial merger may precipitate further mergers in the industry.
50
Suppose that following forward or backwards integration by UA and D1, UB and 
D2 integrate in the same fashion.
51 The impact of counter-mergers is only of relevance in 
the upstream competition case and we concentrate on that here. The payoffs following a 
counter-merger are as in Table 3 where NI, PI and CI are the states of non-integration, 
partial integration by either pair and (complete) integration by both pairs, respectively.
52
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ˆ ˆˆ ( ) () () () ( PI j NI j i A B i j BI D D U D D U DU U DU Z  3 3 3 3 )
50 The past literature is divided on whether bandwagon effects arise. Some researchers examining the
possibility of vertical foreclosure have constructed models whereby vertical integration reduces incentives
for further integration. For instance, Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) argue that initial integration is
driven by competition for assets and the negative externality of integration on non-integrated firms,
something not present for later integration choices. Choi and Yi (2000) and Chen (2001) similarly
demonstrate that potential negative externalities motivating initial integration are not present for later 
integration as such integration may ‘re-symmetrize’ competition and trigger a strong competitive response.
In contrast, HT and McLaren (2000) provide models whereby initial integration raises the incentives for
further vertical integration. In each case, vertical integration exacerbates potential ‘hold-up’ problems faced 
by non-integrated firms and may drive them to integrate. Our approach here does not consider an asset
market effect nor rely on the potential for vertical integration to resolve hold-up problems.
51 As before, we need to make an assumption as to what would happen if negotiations broke down between
the downstream unit of one firm and the other integrated firm. Analogous to our earlier assumption, we
assume that in this case, no negotiations between the two firms would be possible – that is, the downstream
unit of the other firm would not be able to purchase inputs outside their firm.
52 The payoffs in Table 3 are calculated using the same procedure as in Table 2 (as documented in the proof
of Proposition 4).
53 Using symmetry and the results in Table 2. 33
and 12
ˆ ˆ () ( ) ( ) PI j i j FI D D U DU Z  3 3 .
In contrast, the incentive for a counter-merger (that is, the increase in the joint 
payoff to UB and D2 from CI over PI by UA and D1) is: 

11
21 2 1 2 26




There is a positive bandwagon effect if  . Regardless of whether there is BI or 
FI, this will occur if:
2 B FS !
12 12 12 ˆˆ ˆ () () 2 ( CI A B NI A B PI A B D DU U DDU U DDU U 3 3! 3 (5). 
That is, if the marginal increase in industry profits from moving to CI from PI is higher 
than that to PI from NI. If the inequality in (5) is reversed, then there is a negative
bandwagon effect and the incentives for a counter-merger are reduced by the occurrence
of an initial merger.
Observe that this bandwagon effect collapses to 0 when there are no competitive
externalities or the conditions of Proposition 3 hold. In these cases, UB and D2’s
incentives to merge are unchanged by what UA and D1 may have done. The reason is that, 
in this case, the only impact from vertical integration comes from bargaining effects. In 
particular, integration by UB and D2 only rules out possible market structures that involve 
profits that are the same regardless of whether UA and D1 are integrated or not. Thus, the
return to integration does not depend on prior integration. 
When there is an impact on total profits from integration, bandwagon effects are 
possible. However, it is possible that integration could reduce industry profits. In this 
case, an initial merger may reduce the incentives for a second merger.
EXAMPLE (Continued): In our running example, Figure 6) illustrates the size of the 
bandwagon effect. The graph assumes that downstream firms care about the source of 
inputs ( 1 T   ). The bandwagon effect is negative as product differentiation is reduced so 
that a first merger reduces incentives for a second parallel one. 34
Figure 6: Bandwagon Effect (FB2 – SB2)





5.2 How does the possibility of a counter-merger impact on initial merger incentives? 
Our analysis in Sections 3 and 4 has demonstrated that a merger between UA and 
D1 can harm one or both of the remaining firms (at least insofar as bargaining effects are 
concerned). It is conceivable that UB and D2 will have an opportunity to respond to the 
merger by themselves integrating; perhaps mitigating any bargaining advantage UA and
D1 were expecting to receive. 
The effect of counter-mergers on any resulting ‘asset market equilibrium’ has
received some attention in the literature on vertical foreclosure. HT and Ordover, Saloner 
and Salop (1990) (hereafter OSS) consider ‘reduced form’ merger games to evaluate 
whether an initial merger will still proceed if a counter-merger is possible. Here we
consider the HT game (with a comparison to OSS relegated to Appendix C).
54
HT assume that (i) UA can only merge with D1 and UB with D2;
55 (ii) integration is
irreversible; and (iii) if one merger occurs the other pair can also follow suit prior to any 
bargaining or production. This last assumption is a critical one, allowing rival firms to 
respond quickly to a merger by others; thereby, raising the incentives for and potential 
deterrent effect of a counter-merger. Effectively, it corresponds to the extensive form 
game depicted in Figure 7. There, each pair simultaneously chooses whether to merge or
not. If one pair does but the other does not, the latter has a further opportunity to merge
54 Bolton and Whinston (1993) and Gans (2001) also consider market-based allocations of asset ownership.
Those papers highlight the difficulties of providing general solutions given the nature of ownership
externalities. For this reason we focus here to more specific merger games; illustrating the possible effects
of counter-mergers rather than general asset market equilibrium.
55 This is done without loss of generality given the symmetry assumption employed here. In Appendix C, 
we analyse this game without imposing a symmetry assumption.35
but if neither chooses to merge, no further merger is possible.
56
To see how this applies to our model, suppose that UA and D1 always have a 
stand-alone incentive to integrate ( ). In this case, if 1 0 A S ! 2 0 B F d , then there will be a
subgame perfect equilibrium involving partial integration by UA and D1.
57 Notice that, by
symmetry, a necessary condition for this to be the case is that there are negative
bandwagon effects (i.e., (5) does not hold). For this equilibrium, all of the analysis in 
Sections 3 and 4 holds even when a counter-merger is possible. Nonetheless, this
equilibrium involving partial integration is ruled out if either there are no externalities or 
the conditions of Proposition 3 hold as  22 0 BB FS  !  in this case. In the no externality
case, for example, integration results in pure rent distribution so that whenever there is a 
gain from an initial stand-alone merger, there must also be a similar offsetting gain from 
a counter-merger. 
Both non-integration and complete integration (with two vertical mergers) are 
also possible equilibrium outcomes if . In the CI equilibrium, both pairs
merge initially and neither gains an advantage from (nor can commit to) not merging at 
all given the merger of their rivals. An NI equilibrium can co-exist with this one if pairs
prefer NI to CI; that is, neither pair merges initially (and so there is no second period 
merger possibility) and each knows that if it does merge the other will counter-merge,
resulting in CI. 
12 , AB FF! 0
Looking at the CI equilibrium, if   (and by symmetry,  ) then these 
become the relevant incentives for integration under upstream competition. Comparing
this with the incentives for the integration of a single downstream firm under upstream
monopoly, both BI and FI are more likely to occur under upstream competition if:
2 0 B F ! 1 0 A F !
  
11
12 12 12 12 12 62
ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( )() () () () ji j U MA B A B C IA B P IA DDU DU DDU U DDU U DDU U DDU U 3 3 ! 3  3  3  3 B  (6) 
The LHS differs from the condition in Proposition 5. It is easy to see that the LHS of (6) 
is lower if (5) holds; that is, if there are positive bandwagon effects. In this case, the 
incentives to integrate under upstream competition continue to be greater than those 
56 HT argue that this reduced form game corresponds generally to the outcomes of a more elaborate game
in continuous time where in each period, each pair can choose whether to merge or not.
57 This is demonstrated in Appendix C. Notice that UB and D2 do not have an incentive to merge at the same
time as the rival pair as their joint payoff under PI exceeds that under CI.36
under upstream monopoly. Notice that under the conditions of Proposition 3 or if there 
are no competitive externalities, then both conditions are equivalent and the incentive for
BI and FI under a scenario leading to complete integration is no different from the stand-
alone merger incentives.
In summary, our previous analysis of the relative incentives for integration from
upstream competition as opposed to monopoly are generally robust to the inclusion of the 
possibility of a counter-merger. In terms of welfare effects, CI tends to lead to higher 
prices and lower consumer surplus than PI or NI, although higher consumer surplus than 
integration in upstream monopoly. 
EXAMPLE (Continued): In our running example, Figure 8 adds CI to the welfare 
comparisons in Figure 4. Note that CI leads to lower industry profits and consumer 
surplus than PI or NI. Basically, CI distorts productive efficiency even further than PI; 
lowering industry profits overall. 
Figure 8
(T = ½)
(a) Industry Profits  (b) Consumer Surplus 

















This paper has sorted out alternative claims regarding the impact of upstream
competition on the incentives and consequences for vertical integration. While vertical
integration that occurs when there is an upstream monopoly has the greatest potential to 
cause higher prices and lower consumer welfare, this need not translate into greater
incentives for purely strategic vertical integration. Specifically, those incentives may be
higher when there is upstream competition (especially if downstream competition is not 
too intense) and may be higher for backward integration (from the competitive into the 
monopolistic segment) than for forward integration (akin to the more conventional 37
picture of an acquiring monopolistic firm). 
In terms of competition and anti-trust analysis, our results support the notion that 
proposed vertical mergers involving a monopoly bottleneck are of greater concern than 
where there is upstream competition. Nonetheless, in terms of policies designed to 
restructure industries and encourage upstream competition (such as those that have 
occurred in cable television and telecommunications), the potential gains associated with 
these moves may be mitigated as it could encourage greater strategic vertical integration.
Nonetheless, while our model has synthesized and generalized existing models in 
the strategic vertical integration literature – as well as providing a framework linking 
these to models in the property rights literature – there are many possible extensions. In 
particular, moving beyond the simple 2 by 2 case would be useful. This could be by 
expanding the number of upstream and downstream assets as well as deepening the 
vertical chain of production. This would allow a mapping between our work and the work 
of Hendricks and McAfee (2000) who provide a means of linking concentration measures 
and integration in vertical segments with the potential for anticompetitive harm from a 
merger. Their work is based on a mechanism design approach to vertical relations 
whereas ours uses a non-cooperative bargaining model. This would also provide a means 
of dealing more carefully with the impact of vertical integration on entry. 38
AppendixA: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 4: 
The key to the proof lies in several steps. First, we demonstrate that the solution
to our extensive form game are equations of the form specified by the bilateral Nash 
bargaining solution, for each pair, in each subgame of a given supply configuration. 
Second, we demonstrate that, given this, the surplus generated in each subgame is to 
maximise industry profits (if there are no competitive externalities in that subgame) or 
the Cournot outcome (if there are competitive externalities). Finally, we demonstrate that 
the realized payoffs are as listed in Tables 1 and 2. 
Step 1 (Bilateral Bargaining Outcomes): We wish to demonstrate that, say, 
11 (, AA ) p q  satisfy:
1 11 1 1 2 2 argmax ( , , , ) ( , )
A 12 A qA B A B A A q qqqq c qq A S     (7) 
and ^ ` 11 1 1 1 2 21 1 1 1 2 1 2 (,, , ) (, ) A A A B A B A BAAA A A A A ppq q q qp p p p c q q S    )       1 )
where  and  represent the payoffs D 1A ) 1 A ) 1 and UA expect to receive in the
renegotiation subgame triggered by a breakdown in their negotiations. Pairwise 
bargaining takes an alternating offer format. To fix ideas, suppose that Di makes the first
offer that Uj chooses to accept or reject. If the offer is accepted, the negotiation ends on 
the basis of that offer and the game moves on to the next negotiating pair or ends as the 
case may be. If it is rejected, then with probability (1-V) the negotiation ends with no 
supply taking place between the pair and the game moves on to the next negotiating pair.
With probability V, however, Uj is able to make a counter-offer that may be accepted or 
rejected on the same basis as Di’s original offer. Offers alternate until one is accepted or
there is an exogenous breakdown in negotiations. This format is the same as Binmore, 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) for bilateral negotiations. The subtlety here comes from
the potential interrelationships between negotiations in a given sequence. 
Let  be the actual outcomes of negotiations between D (,) ij ij pq  i and Uj and 
 be the beliefs of downstream firms other than i and upstream firms other than j
about the outcomes of those negotiations. Clearly for firms that were part of a particular 
negotiation, . Otherwise, we assume that the agents hold passive 
beliefs.
ˆˆ (,) ij ij pq
ˆˆ (,)(,) ij ij ij ij pq pq   
Rey and Verge (2003) provide a definition of passive beliefs that we rely upon 
here. Here is a definition in relation to a given downstream firm, i. The converse 
definition for beliefs of upstream firms is analogous. 39
Definition (Passive Beliefs). Let   be i and j’s beliefs about the offer it expects to 
receive from j and let   be i’s beliefs about the agreements j will make with any
other firm,  . When i receives an offer from j of 
ˆˆ (,) ij ij pq
ˆˆ (,) kj kj pq
ki z ˆˆ (,)(,) ij ij ij ij pq pq z , it believes that:
1. j expects it to accept this offer, 
2.  will not change, ˆˆ (, kj kj pq )
1 A
3. k reasons the same way.
Suppose first that UA and D1 are the last pair negotiating. One possible 
equilibrium outcome has UA and D1 accepting offers made to them. This requires that 
when D1 makes an offer it solves:
11 (,) 11 1 2 2 1 1
12 1 2
ˆˆ max ( , , , )
ˆ ˆˆ s.t. ( , ) (1 )
AA
A
pq A B A B A B
AA A A A U
qqqq p p




 t   )

 (D1) 
where  is D ˆ
A U V 1’s beliefs about UA’s expected payoff from an agreement (i.e., the
solution to (UA) below). That is, it maximizes its payoffs subject to UA accepting its 
offer. D1 will choose  1A p  so that UA’s participation constraint binds. Notice that UA will
only accept this offer if: 
21 2 21 2 ˆ ˆˆ (, ) (, )
AA AA AA U AA AA U p cq q V p cq q V VV  t    (PC-UA)
being UA’s equilibrium participation constraint where   is U
A U V 
A’s expected payoff from
an agreement.
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However, D1 will only accept this offer if: 
1
Notice that the maximisation problems – (D1) and (UA) – imply that: 
1 1 1122 1 1 1122 1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ (,, , ) (,, , ) ABAB B D ABAB B D q q q qpV q q q qpV SV SV  t         (PC-D1) 
11 11 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ max ( , , , ) ( , ) (1 )
A A D qA B A B B A A A A U V qqqq p p c qq V SV        A V  )
A V  )
1 1 11 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ max ( , , , ) ( , ) (1 )
AA Uq A B A B B A A A A D Vq q q q p p c q q V SV       
11 11 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 ˆˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ max ( , , , ) ( , ) (1 )
A A D qA B A B B A A A A U V qqqq p p c qq V SV      A V  )
A V  )
1 1 11 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 ˆˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ max ( , , , ) ( , ) (1 )
AA Uq A B A B B A A A A D Vq q q q p p c q q V SV     
There are four equations and four unknowns. Notice that the last two involve the same
quantity choice (let this be  ) while we denote the quantity choice in the first and 
second as 
1 ˆ A q
1
1A q   and  1
A
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Notice that these correspond to the payoff outcomes that would result from the 
conjectured bilateral bargaining outcome.
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     (PC-D1)’ 
Re-arranging these constraints and taking the limit as V approaches 1, it is easy to see that 
both inequalities will hold only if: 
11
12 12 1 1122 1 1122
1
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A A qqq     A 2A
1B
 this holds with equality. This will occur if  and
. Thus, the conjectured equilibrium for this negotiation is, in fact, an equilibrium
outcome where any offer by any party is immediately accepted; that is, the parties receive 
2 ˆ A qq   
1 ˆ B qq   
1
ˆ
D V  and  , respectively. In this situation, the above bilateral bargaining outcomes will 




We now consider whether there might be a deviation in an earlier negotiation. If 
there is such a deviation what does the equilibrium of the bilateral bargaining subgame
become? Recall that: 
1
1
11 1 1 2 2 ˆˆ ˆ argmax ( , , , ) ( , )
A 12 A qA B A B A A q qqqq c qq S   A
12 1 11 1 1 2 2 ˆˆˆ argmax ( , , , ) ( , )
A
A
A qA B A B A A q qqqq c qq S    A
2A 1B Thus, if   but  , then  2 ˆ A qq    1 ˆ B qq z  11 ˆ
A
A A qq     and (PC-UA)’ holds with equality (as V
goes to 1); so UA will accept D1’s offer. However, (PC-D1)’ becomes:
11
1 1122 12 1 1122 12 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (,, , ) (, ) (,, , ) (, ) A BAB A AA A BAB A AA qqqq c qq qqqq c qq SS t    
which cannot be true by the definition of 
1
1A q  . Similarly, if  1 ˆ B qq 1B     but  , then  22 ˆ A qq z  A
1
1
1 ˆ A A qq     and (PC-D1)’ holds with equality; so D1 will accept UA’s offer. However, (PC-
UA)’ cannot hold by the definition of 1
A
A q  , so UA will reject D1’s offer. Thus, an earlier 
deviation by a negotiating pair leads to an equilibrium in the bargaining game whereby
one party accepts an offer while the other rejects and waits to make a counter-offer. The
rejecting party is the party that was a party to an earlier deviation. 
The question now becomes: anticipating this equilibrium outcome will an earlier
deviation occur? Consider a deviation by D1 and UB. This results in D1’s offer of 
 being accepted by U
1
12 1 2ˆ ˆˆ (, ) ( 1 )
A AA A A A U pp c q q V VV       )  1 A A. Because of passive 
beliefs, UB will not deviate in its offers to D1 as it perceives that this will not impact on 
the later negotiation between D1 and UA. In contrast, when D1 makes an offer it 
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Notice that the impact on 
1
1A q   is of second order, by the envelope theorem, and so the 
solution to this problem is   (that is, there is no deviation from the conjectured 
equilibrium).
1 ˆ B q
Now consider a deviation by D2 and UA. Substituting in UA’s offer to D1, UA will 
make an offer to D2 that solves (assuming downstream firms make the first offer in any 
negotiation and D2 continues to holds passive beliefs,  ): 1 ˆ A q
2 1
1
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Note that it is not necessary to consider the offer from D2 as its beliefs have not changed. 
The first order condition involves: 
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Evaluate this at   (as defined by the equivalent condition to (7)) gives:  2 ˆ A qq  
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Thus, even anticipating the outcomes from a deviation, UA does not find it profitable to 
deviate from the proposed equilibrium. 
It is easy to see that the logic used here did not rely on UA and D1’s actual place in 
the sequence of negotiations. Hence, under passive beliefs, the Binmore, Rubinstein, 
Wolinsky (1986) outcomes for bilateral negotiations continues to hold in this case. 
Moreover, the situation where there are four supply negotiations can be readily derived 
for the three and two negotiation case. 
Step 2 (Surplus): The above analysis demonstrates that in an individual bilateral 
negotiation, quantity will be chosen to maximize the joint profits of each negotiating pair, 
taking the outcomes of other negotiations as given. That is, 
. If there are no competitive externalities
downstream and quantities can be renegotiated in any breakdown subgame, under passive 
beliefs, these are the only terms in industry profits containing q
*
12 argmax ( , , , ) ( , )
ij ij q i iA iB iA iB j j j qq q q q c S  
ij; hence, if all negotiating 
pairs choose their respective quantities to maximize joint profits, by our concavity 
assumptions, industry profits will be maximized. This establishes efficiency for the no 
externality case (Proposition 1). 
When there are competitive externalities, each pair chooses a quantity that 
maximizes joint profits taking the quantities chosen in other pairs as given. However, 
these quantities are chosen in a manner that equates marginal downstream profit to 
marginal upstream cost. Note that if instead downstream firms chose their quantities 











w   , then this will yield the same outcome as in each negotiation42
(establishing Proposition 2). 
Under integration the quantities change for negotiations between D2 and UA. In 
this case, maximizing bilateral surplus is equivalent to:
. The form of the quantity 
choice problems in the other negotiations will be unchanged. However, the change in one 
negotiation may lead to different quantities in equilibrium.
2 2 1122 1 1122 12 max ( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , )
B qA B A B A B A B A A qqqq qqqq c qq SS  A
Step 3 (Distribution): For distribution, given passive beliefs, in the initial 
subgame, there are four bargaining pairs, the pricing outcomes of which are described by 
the following equations (as V goes to 1).
11 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 (,, , ) (, ) AB AB A B A A A AA A A qqqq p p p p c qq S  )    )    (8) 
11 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 (,, , ) (, ) A B A B A BBBB B B B qqqq p p p p c qq B S  )    )    (9) 
2 1122 2 2 2 1 2 12 (,, , ) (, ) A B A B AB AAA A A A qqqq p p p p c qq 2 A S  )    )    (10) 
2 1122 2 2 2 1 2 12 (,, , ) (, ) A B A B AB BBB B B B qqqq p p p p c qq 2 B S  )    )    (11) 
where  and  ij ) ji )  represent the payoffs Di and Uj expect to receive in the renegotiation
subgame triggered by a breakdown in their negotiations. Solving these equations 
recursively, including the payoffs of each renegotiation subgame (that is, 88 simultaneous
pricing equations), allows us to derive the equilibrium payoffs of each firm as in Table 2
(Proposition 4). 
Under integration, the equations change. For example, for FI, the resulting (Nash) 
bargaining equations for price become: 
1 1 1 1122 1 1 2 12 (,, , ) (, ) AA A B A B A BA A A A tq q q q t p p c q q 1 A S )       )    (12) 
1 1122 1 1 2 12 1 2 12 (,, , ) (, ) (, ) AB AB A B A AA A A B B B BB B B A qqqq t p p c qq p p c qq S     )     )    (13)
2 1122 2 2 2 1 1122 1 1 2 12 (,,, ) (,, , ) (, ) 2 A BAB A B A A BAB A B AA AA A qqqq p p qqqq t p p c qq SS  )      )    (14)
2 1122 2 2 2 1 2 12 (,, , ) (, ) A B A B AB BBB B B B qqqq p p p p c qq 2 B S  )    )    (15) 
Notice that there is a change in negotiating pairs relative to the non-integrated case. UA
negotiates a supply agreement with UB for the supply of inputs to D1. This is because the
residual control rights of the downstream asset have been transferred to UA. Again, 
solving these equations recursively, including the payoffs of each renegotiation subgame,
allows us to derive the equilibrium payoffs of each firm as in Table 2 (Proposition 4).
Contingent Contracts: Finally, we demonstrate that the above equilibrium is also an 
equilibrium when pairs can negotiate contracts contingent upon the breakdown of others. 
Suppose that UA and D1 were the first pair to negotiate and consider a situation where
they expect other pairs to reach agreement so long as they themselves continue to reach 
agreement. Let  11 () , () AA p mq m  be the price and quantity pairs between UA and D1
contingent upon market structure, m. In this case, UA and D1 will choose quantities to 
maximise their bilateral surplus when 12AB mD D U U   . Moreover, under passive beliefs, 
for other market structures, any deviation from the equilibrium where they maximise
their bilateral surplus given m will not improve their bilateral surplus in any other market
structure. This is because a deviation on a contingency will not be observed by the other
party on subsequent negotiations and will lead to the either the rejection equilibrium43
posited earlier or no agreement in that negotiation. Given feasibility, in either case, a 
deviation will reduce bilateral surplus. Hence, UA and D1 will not deviate from the 
conjectured equilibrium. Applying this logic to all four negotiations demonstrates that the 
equilibrium outcomes in Propositions 1, 2 and 4 are also equilibrium outcomes where 
pairs can negotiate binding breakdown contingent contracts. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Suppose that  11 22 (,, , ) ( , ) ( ) ii Ai B i A i B A B A B i A i B qqq q P q qq q q q S      . Then, under 
both upstream monopoly and competition, with non-integration, equilibrium quantities 
are determined by: 
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Suppose that each downstream firm was supplied positive input quantities from each 
upstream firm and each of the above conditions held with equality. Then,  must
equal . Note that if, say, both   and   are strictly positive, both (16) and
(17) hold with equality implying that 
11 A qq 







ww   . This can only be true if isoquants are 
linear (in which case any combination of   and   satisfying   is an
equilibrium. If isoquants are strictly concave, then 







ww z  implying that either one of 
(16) and (17) hold with equality with the other being a strict inequality. Applying the 
same logic to D2’s inputs, an equilibrium outcome exists that involves   and 
 at their Cournot equilibrium quantities with (16) and (19) holding with equality
but (17) and (18) have a strict inequality if isoquants are strictly concave (as 
21 0 AB qq   





























ww   ).
Under upstream monopoly (ii), with vertical integration, equilibrium quantities 
are determined by: 
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w  , (22) and (23) are only satisfied if 
 while (20) and (21) cannot hold if  22 0 AB qq   22 0 AB qq !  and (22) and (23) hold. As44
22 0 AB qq   , given the perfect substitutes assumption, industry profits are maximized
under upstream monopoly. Moreover when  12 0 BB qq   , the only way (20) and (22) can 
simultaneously hold is if  . Hence,  2 0 A q   12 12
ˆ ˆ () () A BA B D DU U DDU U 3  3. The case for 
12 12
ˆ ˆ () () A A D DU DDU 3  3 follows analogously. 
Under upstream competition (i), (23) is still as in (19) In this case, the only way 
all four inequalities can be satisfied is if 12 0 BA qq    ; in which case, given the
homogeneity of upstream costs, equilibrium downstream outputs are at their Cournot
levels and so total industry profits remains the same as under non-integration. Note that 
the perfect substitutes assumption is not required in this case.
Appendix B: Feasibility Conditions 
In this appendix, we provide explicitly, the conditions for our solution in Table 2 
to be feasible. However, we do this for the special case where both upstream and both 
downstream firms are symmetric. While this simplifies notation, it is not an innocuous 
assumption. Indeed, it is precisely where one firm is far more productive than another
that feasibility may breakdown. Thus, our purpose here is to give a feel for the conditions 
rather than a comprehensive treatment.
For the symmetric case, under non-integration, feasibility requires the following 














ˆ () ( )
ˆ () ( ) ( ) ,
ˆˆ () m a x ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
ˆ 2( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆˆ () ( ) ( ) (
ji j
ii A B i j
AB iAB i i j
ij i j i iA B ij
AB i iAB i
DDU DU
DDU DUU DU
DDU U DU U DDU DU
DU D U DDU DU U DU




­½ 3 3  3
°°
°° 3t 3  3  3 ®¾
°°
3 3  3  3 °° ¯¿
3 3  3  3  11 2 ˆ )( ) jA B UD D U U  t3
where  is equilibrium industry profits where one downstream-upstream pair cannot 
trade with one another. Natural sufficient conditions for these to be satisfied are that 
.
Notice that these collapse to
1 ˆ
 3
12 1 12 12 ˆˆ ˆ () () m a x { ( ) , ( ) , 2 ( , AB AB j iAB i j i j DDUU DDUU DDU DUU DU D U   3t 3 t 3 3 3 )}
1
12 2 ˆ () ( ji DDU DU 3t 3 ) j
) 
)
 if D1 and D2 produce final goods 
that are perfect substitutes and UA and UB are perfectly substitutable for one another (say
having identical constant cost functions) as 
, and 
. With linear demand (P = 1 – Q) and constant costs (c<1), this 
condition is equivalent to: 
12 1 12 12 ˆˆ ˆ () () ( ) 2 ( , AB AB i i j i j DDUU DDUU DDU DU D U  3  3   3   3
() ( iAB ij DU U DU 3  3
2 7
72 (1 ) 0 c ! . Thus, the feasibility condition is satisfied. 45
When integration occurs, the feasibility conditions will be contingent upon 
whether there is forward or backwards integration. In this case, however, we can gather
further information from the fact that integration is possible; namely, that the acquired
firm still operates and hence, their payoffs must be feasible. So if UA took over D1, then 
an agreement with D1 will be presumed to be feasible. This means that it must be the case 
that: 12 12
ˆˆ ˆˆ () ( ) 2 ( ) A Bi i A B D DU U DDU DU U 3 3 t 3 . Under symmetry, in addition to
conditions under non-integration, the following conditions are required for feasibility: 
21 2 1 2
ˆˆ ˆˆ 3( ) ( ) 3 ( ) () BA B ii A B i j DDUU DDU DUU DU  3 3  3  3 0 t
^ ` 11 2 1 2 1 2
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For the case the perfect substitutes upstream and downstream, these reduce to: 
1
12 3 ˆ () ( ii DDU DU 3t 3 ) j  (a weaker condition than that for non-integration). 
Appendix C: Merger Game 
Here we analyse the merger game when upstream and downstream firms are not 
necessarily symmetric but UA and D1 have a stand-alone incentive to merge. We focus 
here on the BI case; the analysis of FI is similar. Let, 

11
1 1 12 12 1 26
ˆ ˆˆ () () A A AB N I AB S DDU U DDU U Z {3  3 
 
11
2 2 12 12 2 26
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11
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11
21 2 1 1 2 26
ˆˆ ˆˆ () () BC IA B A A B F DDU U DDU U 2 Z {3  3 
 
11
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Here Sx is the stand-alone merger incentive for pair x, Fx is its follow-on incentive and Cx
is the pair’s preference for both mergers as opposed to non-integration. Recall that we
require the incentive to merge to be strictly positive in order for the merger to proceed
and we assume that  . 1 0 A S !
We are interested here in the conditions that lead to (pure strategy) equilibria with
complete integration (CI), no integration (NI) and partial integration (PI). A critical 
condition driving the existence of one type of equilibrium or the other is whether there is 
a follow-on incentive for a counter-merger. In this regard there are four broad cases. 
Case 1: . In this case, both pairs prefer PI where the other pair merges to CI.
As , this means that PI where U
21 , BA FF d
1 0 A S ! A and D1 are the only merging pair is always a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. If, in addition, , there is another PI equilibrium with 
a sole merger between U
2 0 B S !
B and D2.
Case 2: . The PI equilibrium involving U 2 0 B F d A and D1 continues to be an 
equilibrium in this case but the PI equilibrium involving UB and D2 no longer exists. The
only other candidate equilibrium is CI; which exists if . In this equilibrium, both 
pairs merge initially. U
2 0 B C !
A-D1 deviating a merging second offers them no additional payoff.
A UB-D2 deviation will result in NI as they do not engage in a follow-on merger; which
strictly reduces their joint payoff.
Case 3: . The PI equilibrium involving U 1 0 A F d A and D1 no longer exists. If 
, a CI equilibrium exists as it is a dominant strategy for U 1 0 A C ! A-D1 to merge initially.
Given this, UB-D2 will counter-merge and are indifferent between doing this and merging
initially. If , a PI equilibrium involving U 2 0 B S ! B and D2 exists and an NI equilibrium
does not exist. On the other hand, if  2 0 B S d , an NI equilibrium exists if  (as U 1 0 A C d A-
D1 anticipates a counter-merger and prefers NI to CI).
Case 4: . No PI equilibrium exists. There is always a CI equilibrium where
both pairs choose to merge initially and, given that the other firm is doing this, neither 
can, by not merging initially, commit not to counter-merge. Hence, they are indifferent
between merging initially or not, so it is an equilibrium. If both  , an NI
equilibrium also exists. In this equilibrium, both pairs choose not to merge initially and 
neither deviates as they know this will lead to a counter-merger and CI (something which 
1 0, AB FF  2
0 12 , AB CCd47
reduces their payoff). 
In summary, the conditions that support the four possible equilibrium types are:
x NI: (1)  , 12 0 AB FF d 2 0 B S d  and  1 0 A C d ; (2)  1 0, AB FF 2   and  . 12 ,0 AB CCd
x PI (involving UA-D1): 2 0 B F d ;
x PI (involving UB-D2): 1 0 A F d  and  ; 2 0 B S !
x CI: (1)   and  ; (2)  1 0 A F  2 0 B C ! 2 0 B F   and  ; (3) 1 0 A C ! 12 0, AB FF  .
There are three interesting specific cases to consider. First, under the conditions of 
Proposition 3, both  1 Z  and  2 Z  are positive. This rules out PI as an equilibrium as, under 
those conditions, industry profits are the same regardless of whether there is NI, PI or CI. 
For the same reason it rules out the first type of NI equilibrium (but for a special case) as 
both  and   must be non-negative. It does not, however, rule out the second type of 
NI equilibrium (again except for a special case) as either  and   must be non-
negative and this is certainly possible. Thus, both NI and CI remain equilibrium
possibilities.
1 A S 2 B S
1 A C 2 B C
Second, suppose there are no externalities. In this case, PI involving UA and D1
merging requires that  22 () ( ) A BB DU U DU 3! 3  and 1 () ( 1 ) A B DU U DU 3  3 A
2 B
. However, if
UB and D2 face additional merger costs, this condition can be relaxed. Nonetheless, both 
NI and CI remain possible equilibrium outcomes (for the same reasons as in the previous
paragraph).
Finally, suppose upstream and downstream firms are symmetric. Then PI is only
an equilibrium if  . If  12 0 AB FF  d 1 0 A FF  , CI is also an equilibrium but NI is only 
an equilibrium if  12 12
ˆ ˆˆ () () CI A B NI A B DDUU DDUU 3d 3.
We now turn to consider the OSS merger game. It is very similar to that of HT but 
with a more asymmetric ‘playing field.’ Their game has two stages. In stage 1, D1 and D2
bid to acquire UA. If UA rejects both bids, there is NI. If UA accepts a bid, the losing 
downstream firm bids for UB. If this accepted there is CI, otherwise there is PI. This game
is depicted in Figure 9.
To simplify exposition, suppose that if any firm acquires UA, it is D1 (see Chen,
2001, for a discussion). Working backwards, if this happens, D2 will acquire UB if and
only if  . Thus, there are two cases to consider. First, if  , PI occurs if 
 and NI occurs otherwise. Second, if  , then CI occurs if  ;
otherwise, NI is the unique equilibrium. Therefore, in contrast to the HT game, there is 
always a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Other than that, incentives for an
initial merger are driven by the same conditions as in the HT game.
2 0 B F ! 2 0 B F d
1 0 A S ! 2 0 B F ! 1 0 A C !48
Figure 1: Extensive Form Game 
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              (b) Forward Integration                     (c) Backwards Integration 
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D1 D2 D1 D250











Figure 7: HT’s Merger Game 
UA-D1 Merge?
yes no




UB-D2 Counter-Merge? UA-D1 Counter-Merge?
yes yes no no
CI CI PI PI52
Figure 9: OSS’s Merger Game 
D1 and D2 bid for UA




Table 1: Payoffs in No Externality Case 
(where (x,y) = (1,1) for NI, (0,1) for FI and (1,0) for BI) 
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Table 2: Payoffs in Competitive Externality Case 
(where (x,y) = (1,1) for NI, (0,1) for FI and (1,0) for BI) 
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Table 3: Payoffs from Second Merger 
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